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ABSTRACT 
 
Recently, several states have passed legislation allowing conscientious objection for 
social workers. Due to the potential impact on the profession that these policies carry, it 
is critical that this issue be explored and discussed within the social work profession. This 
article examines the arguments for and against conscientious objection, discusses the use 
of conscientious objection in other professions, and then explores the potential options 
and consequences for social work. The argument is made that the profession of social 
work should seek to define itself and its values related to conscientious objection before 
outside forces make the decision for us. 
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Introduction 
 Over the past several years’ battle lines have formed regarding religious freedom 
and the rights of certain marginalized groups.   These included: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
(2014), which pitted government mandated contraceptive care versus the deeply held 
religious beliefs of a closely held company (i.e. a company that does not have a readily 
available public market for trading shares); Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which resulted 
in recognition of same-gender marriage; and, Masterpiece v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission (2017), which could result in the ability of business to deny services due to 
deeply held beliefs.  Inevitably, the escalation of the social issues surrounding religious 
liberty and equality has resulted in the recent adoption of religious liberty laws that 
attempt to protect individuals with closely held religious beliefs from being forced to 
violate their moral code by providing services to a population that engages in behavior 
they find immoral or abhorrent.  Historically, the social work profession has been on the 
side of fighting for marriage equality, and ending discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity.  However, this new battlefield has resulted in the 
introduction of policies that aim to provide social workers with the right to refuse 
services to an individual that engages in behaviors that violates deeply held beliefs of the 
social worker.  Such bills in various stages of passage can be found in Tennessee (HB 
1840), as well as Mississippi (HB 1523).  Other variations of religious liberty laws have 
been attempted in Georgia (vetoed by the Governor), and North Carolina (signed into law 
but subsequently repealed). These various policies illustrate is that the fight between 
religious liberty and equality continues to intensify, and it is the opinion of the author that 
it is only a matter of time before other states follow suit and introduce similar legislation. 
 This conflict has put the social work profession in the precarious position of 
having to take a stance on whether to make clear that social workers will be held 
accountable for their actions if they refuse service due to a deeply held belief, or to allow 
their members to exercise their legal rights if they do deny service in a state where it is 
allowed.  Regardless of the decision the profession will ultimately make, the battle lines 
have been drawn and the profession has little choice but to formulate a position, and 
create subsequent policy to support that decision.  This paper outlines the arguments 
supporting and opposing conscientious objection (i.e. refusing service due to a deeply 
held belief) in social work, and explores the possible routes and outcomes for selecting a 
course of action.  Arguably, the most devastating route would be for the profession to not 
take a stance on religious liberty and equality, and thereby let society decide the values 
our profession will uphold. 
 
Conscientious Objection 
People are likely most familiar with conscientious objection (CO) in regard to the 
draft and military service (Chavkin, Leitman, & Polin, 2013). However, that it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to cover the history of CO with military service. It has only been 
within the last few decades that CO due to deeply held beliefs of those in non-military 
professions have become a national debate. Social work has been able to avoid much of 
that debate by making it clear that it is unethical to discriminate against certain 
populations, and reinforcing the belief that social workers must, “uphold the profession’s 
values” (Reamer, 2006, p. 37), even if those values conflict with deeply held personal 
values.  It is also important to note that the profession still allows social workers to 
practice in agencies that may deny service based on that agency’s deeply held beliefs, or 
earn degrees from accredited institutions that may have policies antithetical to social 
work values.   
In instances of an inability to resolve differences between personal and 
professional values, it is not uncommon for professionals to find a new profession.  As 
Strom-Gottfriend (2007) notes: 
When we accept membership in a profession, we also accept the values and 
standards of that profession as they are put forth through codes of ethics and our 
professional organizations’ credos.  The process of professional acculturation 
helps people decide if they can embrace the values and standards of their chosen 
fields.  Those who find themselves in constant conflict with the core beliefs of the 
profession must reflect seriously on their suitability for the field they have chosen.  
(p. 12)  
Despite the historical impetus to either accept the values of the profession or be 
encouraged to find a different line of work, it is still important to examine social work’s 
place among the other professions in regards to conscientious objection. This section 
explores the role of conscientious objection in law, nursing, medicine, and pharmacy. 
 Law.  One profession that provides some level of discretion in regard to accepting 
clients is law.  As can be seen throughout the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(2015), lawyers and firms are provided with opportunities for declining or terminating 
representation if the client is engaged in “repugnant” behavior, or if the lawyer’s ability 
to provide counsel would be limited due to a conflict in beliefs (Spahn, 2011).  The rules 
also outline a clear differentiation of a lawyer’s personal view from those of their clients.  
For example, Rule 1.2(b) states, “A lawyer's representation of a client, including 
representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's 
political, economic, social or moral views or activities”. 
 Instead of forcing a lawyer to accept a client regardless of any conflicting 
personal belief, the onus is placed on each lawyer to assess whether or not they can 
provide adequate legal counsel.  If the lawyer believes the client is engaging in repugnant 
behavior, they are provided an outlet for discharging that client.  However, as Spahn 
(2011) notes, that is an unusual occurrence since there is an honor in the profession in 
representing clients, which are considered outcasts.  Put another way, law prides itself on 
working with clients, even if others may find them repugnant.  One only has to examine 
John Adams defending the British soldiers who perpetrated the Boston Massacre in 1770 
to see the historical significance of defending the “bad guy” that is present in the 
profession. 
 Nursing.  Although conscientious objection in nursing is still highly 
controversial, and disapproved of by a majority of nurses, it remains an option (Davis, 
Schrader, & Belcheir, 2012).  This is especially true in relation to areas such as 
reproductive healthcare and palliative care (Lachman, 2014).  In part, this is due to the 
moral distress caused if a nurse is forced to go against a deeply held belief, as well as the 
consequences that the distress can have on the profession (Beil & Breslin, 2008; Epstein 
& Delgado, 2010).  According to the American Nurses Association Code of Ethics (2015) 
conscientious objection is allowed: 
When nurses are placed in circumstances that exceed moral limits or that violate 
moral standards in any nursing practice setting, they must express to the 
appropriate authority their conscientious objection to participating in these 
situations.  When a particular decision or action is morally objectionable to the 
nurse, whether intrinsically so or because it may jeopardize a specific patient, 
family, community, or population, or when it may jeopardize nursing practice the 
nurse is justified in refusing to participate on moral grounds. (p. 21) 
As can be seen in the above statement, the idea of conscientious objection is not just 
tacitly approved in the nursing profession, but laid out specifically in their ethical code.  
Despite the clarity in the code of ethics, nurses cannot object to treating a patient for 
reasons that are not clearly morally objectionable, such as to only serve self-interest 
(Lachman, 2014).  That difference between morally objectionable and serving self-
interest is important to note since nursing may allow conscientious objection regarding 
abortion services, but not abortion aftercare (Dickens, 2001).  These intricacies 
demonstrate that nursing has found an option to provide some discretion to those nurses 
with deep personal beliefs, while still maintaining the values and goals of the profession.  
 Medicine. Physicians have the longest history of acceptance and application of 
conscientious objection (Dickens, 2001). This ranges from reproductive healthcare (Shaw 
& Downie, 2014), to palliative healthcare and capital punishment (Chavkin et al., 2013).  
According to the American Medical Association Code of Ethics (2014) section 
10.05(3)(c), a physician may refuse service to a patient if, “A specific treatment sought 
by an individual is incompatible with the physician’s personal, religious, or moral 
beliefs”.  There is even a strong argument that the Hippocratic Oath supports the use of 
conscientious objection by physicians (Dickens, 2001). 
 Despite the medical acceptance of conscientious objection, there are some 
requirements for physicians who utilize that option.  As Dickens (2001) notes, physicians 
who object to certain treatments should provide a referral to someone who does not have 
the same objections.  Physicians should also make an effort to make their conscientious 
objections clear at the forefront of treatment, so that patients are aware and can seek 
treatment elsewhere for issues that the physician may object to.  However, despite the 
rich history of conscientious objection within the medical field, the conditions under 
which physicians may conscientiously object (e.g. reasonability requirement, genuine 
requirement), and requirements for those who do object, is hotly debated (for example 
see Card, 2014; Dickens, 2001; Kaczor, 2012; Kantymir & Mcleod, 2014; Marsh, 2014).   
 Pharmacy.  Arguably, pharmacist’s use of conscientious objection is the most 
controversial of all the professions discussed in this article.  Unlike physicians, there has 
not been the historic support or tradition of refusal of service in pharmacy (Grady, 2006).  
Some arguments are even made that pharmacists have an obligation to service patients, 
and that obligation “override claims of conscience” (Wicclair, 2006, p. 225).  As Grady 
(2006) further discussed, this new integration of conscientious objection has led to 
conflicting state policies, putting pharmacists in an uncomfortable position of not having 
a clear policy in which to follow since it may vary from state to state, and from nation to 
nation.  For example, Great Britain allows pharmacists to refuse service for reasons of 
conscience, as long they provide an appropriate referral to the client (Deans, 2013). 
 Like most of the other professions discussed in this article, contraceptive 
medicine is the main issue in which conscientious objection is exercised (Chavkin et al., 
2013; Grady, 2006; Shaw & Downie, 2014).  The opposing side of the argument on the 
inclusion of conscientious objection involves – on one side – the ethical standard of 
respecting autonomy and the dignity and worth of a patient as stated by the American 
Pharmacists Association Code of Ethics:   
A pharmacist promotes the right of self-determination and recognizes individual 
self-worth by encouraging patients to participate in decisions about their health. A 
pharmacist communicates with patients in terms that are understandable. In all 
cases, a pharmacist respects personal and cultural differences among patients. 
On the other side, some pharmacists argue that not only should pharmacists be allowed to 
object to delivery of some contraceptive medications, but that, “…a pharmacist is 
obligated to refuse to dispense contraception” (Kinney III, 2012, p. 675).  While that may 
appear to be an extreme view to some, it provides a clear illustration of a deeply held 
belief.  It would not be hard to imagine the potential for moral distress if that pharmacist 
was forced to dispense medication that they believed was morally reprehensible.   
Arguments against Conscientious Objection 
 If the social work profession is going to adopt the stance in which conscientious 
objection is not allowed, which would sharply contrast social work from the other 
professions discussed, it is imperative that arguments against its inclusion are well 
constructed and defensible.  This section lays out two of those arguments, which include 
limited availability of social workers, and professional growth.  The section also explores 
the values argument, and posits that this argument is less defensible despite its historic 
popularity in defense of denial of conscientious objection to social workers.  While the 
two arguments discussed are not exhaustive, they provide a defensible base for its 
exclusion. 
 The first argument against conscientious objection surrounds the limited 
availability of social workers and the subsequent negative impact on client access.  
Unlike previous professions discussed, there are frequently few social work options for 
clients under normal circumstances. This mismatch would almost certainly lead to even 
fewer clients receiving services if social workers exercised conscientious objection 
options.  Unlike law, which has an almost universal professional honor in working with 
clients viewed as deplorable by society, social work does not possess that badge of honor 
across the profession.  Without that extra motivation to see those clients, it is unlikely 
some clients would be provided with services.   
 The limited availability of social workers would be further exasperated due to 
billing restrictions with some payer sources.  For example, if a payer source requires a 
licensed clinical social worker in order to bill for services, the permission to 
conscientiously object to certain clients would burden agencies that may not have an 
abundance of licensed social workers in which to transfer those clients.  If the agency did 
not possess another appropriately licensed social worker willing to see those clients, the 
next logical question would be whether the extra cost – since the insurance would be 
unbillable – would be the responsibility of the agency or directly billed to the client.  
With the possibility of clients or agencies being forced to cover the costs associated with 
an individual social worker refusing to see a subset of clients, it is no longer is a decision 
that only impacts the conscientious objector. 
 A second reason for denying social workers the ability to refuse service to clients 
due to deeply held beliefs relates to the personal and professional growth of each social 
worker.  In order to learn to work with clients who come from different backgrounds, a 
social worker needs to be exposed to cultures that may challenge deeply held beliefs.  If a 
social worker is allowed to operate in a personally selected silo of clients, it is unlikely 
that the social worker would be required to work through those challenges, which would 
inevitably stunt growth as a professional (Strom-Gottfried, 2007).  For example, a social 
worker that engages with and works with a client previously convicted of a sexual crime 
may come to the realization that despite previous behavior, everyone has dignity and 
worth. This realization may not occur if one always opted out of working with this ‘class’ 
of client.  Additionally, a social worker who choices not to work with a same-gender 
couple may become stunted in professional and personal growth as it relates to the 
diversity of couples.  
 The values argument.  Arguably, the most popular argument that is used to 
justify the exclusion of a conscientious objection option for social work is the values 
argument.  This argument is based on the premise that the very foundation of the social 
work profession lies in the values that have shaped the profession (Levy, 1976).  
Therefore, to exclude any client or subgroup of client would inherently violate the values 
of our profession, such as social justice and the dignity and worth of a person (National 
Association of Social Workers, 2007).  This section will lie out the argument for why 
using professional values to exclude a conscientious objection option may be undesirable, 
as it is less defensible than the previous arguments. 
 The formal introduction of core values to the NASW Code of Ethics did not occur 
until the 1999 code was released (Reamer, 2006), and have since become a major piece 
of social work education (Croxton & Jayaratne, 1999).  However, that is not to say that 
values have not played an integral role in defining the profession.  After Flexner’s (1915) 
scathing presentation on why social work was not a profession, social work spent the next 
several decades attempting to define itself in a way that would justify its inclusion as a 
bon-a-fide profession (for examples see Bartlett, 1958; Brieland, 1977; Gordon, 1962, 
Gordon, 1965a; Gordon, 1965b; NASW 1958).  Throughout this process, values emerged 
as a cornerstone of social work practice (Boehm, 1958; Brieland, 1977; Gordon, 1965).  
Therefore, an argument is frequently made that due to the historical significance of values 
in the social work profession – and because refusing service violates one or more of those 
values – practitioners cannot conscientiously object to serving clients due to a deeply 
held belief.  However, that argument proves difficult to defend due to its assumptions that 
other professions, which do allow conscientious objection, are not based in similar 
values.  An argument can also be made that conscientious objection could be achieved 
without the social worker directly refusing to serve specific clients, which would 
eliminate the appearance of direct discrimination by the individual worker.  Much in the 
same way it is the responsibility of physicians to openly disclose objections before 
treatment. 
If an argument is made that social workers cannot deny service due to the values 
of the profession, the assumption is that our values are somehow different and play a 
more integral role in service delivery than the other professions that allow conscientious 
objection.  In reality, this assumption is false.  For example, medicine heavily values 
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice (Beauchamp & Childress, 2012).  As 
another example, the first provision in the nursing code of ethics states, “The nurse 
practices with compassion and respect for the inherent dignity, worth, and unique 
attributes of every person” (American Nurses Association, 2015, p. 1).  As can be seen, 
both nursing and medicine value nearly the same principles that social work does, and yet 
only social work does not allow conscientious objection.  Besides sharing common 
values, these professions also share a duty to treat (Sweifach, 2011), with the primary 
difference being that the non-social work professions accept that if a practitioner is faced 
with a client that challenges a deeply held belief, it may elicit moral distress and not be in 
the best interest of the client or provider to engage in treatment if the conflict cannot be 
resolved (Davis et al., 2012; Zuzelo, 2007).  
  Another reason that the value argument should not be used is that it is dependent 
on the assumption that there must be a direct refusal of service between the social worker 
and the client if conscientious objection is permitted.  Put in a different light, this is also 
the argument that is frequently given to say that denial of services equates to 
discrimination.  However, as with other professions that allow denial of service, there is a 
method for allowing practitioners to not violate deeply held beliefs without that worker 
having to directly refuse seeing the client, or being accused of being discriminatory 
against them.  As Kaczor (2012) notes, “conscience protections do not empower 
individuals to subordinate others to their preferences, since denial …does not necessarily 
mean that the doctor’s preferences will be realized” (p. 61).  An argument can also be 
made that refusal of service by a provider does not mean that the entire profession of that 
provider objects to that treatment (Kaczor, 2012).  Therefore, as long as appropriate 
referral options are available, the need of the patient is still met.   
Conscientious objection could also occur at the agency level, before assignment to 
a practitioner, in order to minimize the effects of the worker refusing to provide service.  
There can be little doubt that a client being told by their social worker that they cannot 
see them due to deeply held beliefs would be traumatizing.  However, there are policy 
responses available, which simultaneously allow conscientious objection as well as 
minimizing negative consequences from that option (Chavkin et al., 2013).  One of those 
options is the registration with the state board and/or requiring providing notice to 
employers of conscientious objection.  This option would allow clients to select 
appropriate social workers, as well as provide employers with information in which to 
appropriately assign clients.  Another option is to forbid conscientious objection in cases 
or agencies where there is not another worker available to see the client.  Since that limit 
would be known by the agency and provider before a client is seen, the social worker 
would know beforehand that conscientious objection was not an option.  Either of these 
policy responses provides the agency options that minimize the potential negative effects 
of conscientious objection. 
 
Arguments for Conscientious Objection   
It is important to also provide an unbiased discussion of the reasons for adopting 
conscientious objection.  The argument that supports the inclusion of conscientious 
objection is that it supports the wellbeing of the professional.  Being able to refuse 
service due to a deeply held moral or religious belief provides protection from moral 
distress (Davis et al., 2012; Zuzelo, 2007), and supports the liberty of the practitioner 
(Savulescu, 2006).  Moral distress can be defined as a violation of moral integrity, which 
leads to various negative emotions, such as helplessness, anger, and frustration (Davis et 
al., 2012).  Repeated instances of moral distress can lead to burnout, and therefore 
directly impact the delivery of service.  Other professions allow this type of refusal of 
service and yet have long histories of fighting for values such as justice, autonomy, and 
dignity and worth of the client.  The difference is that they apply those principles not only 
to the clients, but also to the practitioners.  Stated differently, in order to respect values 
such as justice and worth with clients, one must also respect professionals who serve 
those clients.       
The second argument for conscientious objection is that it helps support the 
wellbeing of the profession.  Many professions, including social work, struggle with not 
having enough practitioners to serve the population (Chavkin et al., 2013).  Therefore, 
when a group of practitioners experience repeated examples of moral distress, they may 
leave the profession; thereby, further compounding the problem.  In addition social work 
already provides exceptions for social workers practicing in private agencies to exclude 
certain clients or treatments due to religious beliefs. Hence, it could be argued that the 
profession could increase the number of professionals if they equally applied those 
exceptions to the profession as a whole by incorporating conscientious objection.  
The Three Possible Paths 
 Ultimately, the profession of social work has three possible options for 
conscientious objection.  We can either eliminate it as being an option for social work let 
state governments and courts decide the outcome for us, or we can incorporate it into the 
profession with the appropriate policy responses in order to minimize its negative impact 
on clients.  This section explores those three options, as well as possible outcomes for 
each of the choices.  In addition to that discussion, several of the policy responses that 
could be included with the final option are also provided in order to illustrate how a 
comprehensive conscientious objection policy could look for the social work profession. 
 The first option for the profession is to take a strong stance against conscientious 
objection, and explicate that social workers will not be allowed to use it, even if states 
make such options legal.  Mississippi House Bill 1523 or Tennessee House Bill 1840 
(both signed into law) are both examples of state policies that make it legal for counselors 
to refuse service for deeply held beliefs.  
 If the complete refusal option were used, the likely outcome would be a social 
worker exercising one’s legal right to refuse service, and subsequently having their 
license suspended, or being forced to undergo additional training or supervision.  This 
would lead to that social worker having legal standing in which to pursue litigation 
against the state board.  Since, “professional organizations’ positions are not legally 
binding” there is a real possibility the lawsuit could be lost, and the profession forced to 
adopt a position they had previously taken a strong stance against (Grady, 2006, p. 329).  
One only has to look at settlement and fallout of the Brooker lawsuit against the 
University of Missouri – due to punishment over the student’s stance on same-gender 
adoption – or Ward v. Polite et al. (2012), in which the 6th Circuit court overturned the 
expulsion of the student, in order to see the possible fallout from legal action.  In regards 
to Ward v. Polite et al. (2012), which settled out of court, the 6th Circuit did state that 
there was not an issue with the educational institution having a policy that does not allow 
transfers based on value differences between the counselor and client.  However, the 
court also stated that the profession “adheres to an ethics code that permits values-based 
referrals in general” (p. 3).  This interpretation of the NASW Code of Ethics by the court 
may prove increasingly important if litigation is pursued due to consequences from 
utilizing state supported conscientious objection.  Ultimately, if the profession decides to 
take a strong stance against conscientious objection, social work must also prepare for the 
litigation that will certainly follow, and accept the possibility of being forced to adopt a 
position the vast majority of social workers do not agree with (Sweifach, 2011).   
 The second option is to let the state governments and courts decide the viability of 
conscientious objection for the profession.  In many ways, this would be similar to 
exceptions provided to for-profit agencies that maintain the religious freedom to not serve 
certain clients.  With this option, social work could maintain a public stance against 
conscientious objection while still providing exceptions to workers in states that provide 
religious liberty protections.  At first blush this option may appear to provide a win-win 
situation for the profession, since social work would avoid taking any hard stances either 
way.  However, the down side with this choice is that it depends on a minority of states 
adopting religious liberty laws, and the positive outcomes of any potential Supreme Court 
case that may arise due to conflicting state policies.  Another negative consequence with 
this option is that it takes the ability to define the profession out of the hands of social 
workers, and puts it in the hands of states and courts.  With the previous hundred years of 
intense debate and discussion involving how social work is defined, it would be 
counterproductive to now let other entities define our values for us. 
 The third option is to follow in the footsteps of other professions in order to allow 
social workers the option to conscientiously object.  This option does not inherently mean 
that conscientious objection need be incorporated carte blanche, and indeed no profession 
allows refusal of service to rise to that level.  It would be reasonable to include limits to 
objection, as well as to incorporate either – or both – the reasonability requirement and 
genuineness requirement.  The reasonability and genuineness requirements are two 
examples of how a profession could put the onus on the practitioner to support their 
conscientious objection to serving a particular client.  With this approach, any refusal of 
service must be supported and meet a certain level before it would be considered valid 
(Marsh, 2014).  The reasonability requirement states that an objection must be deemed 
reasonable by an outside committee in order to be valid (Card, 2011).  The genuineness 
requirement is essentially the same, except that the practitioner must demonstrate to a 
committee that their conscientious objection is genuine (Myers & Woods, 2007).  Marsh 
(2014) defined genuine as, “…a deep feature of their person and not a cover up for 
questionable biases or prejudices” (p. 313). 
 The other importance limits on conscientious objection would be the exceptions 
in which refusal of service would not be allowed.  The primary exclusion, which is also 
present in current religious liberty policies, is that a practitioner cannot refuse emergency 
treatment.  For example, Mississippi HB 1523 does not allow conscientious objection for 
emergency treatment, which would include clients actively presenting as a risk to 
themselves or others.  Another limit that could be placed on conscientious objection is 
that it could be excluded from use when there is not the possibility of referral to another 
practitioner due to competency requirements, billing requirements, or case load 
restrictions.  An example of this can be found in the 2004 Michigan Conscientious 
Objector Policy Act, which would not have allowed employment termination based solely 
on conscientious objection, but did allow employers to terminate a worker – provided a 
60 day notice was given – if their refusal of service interfered with 10% or more of the 
hours of duty per week (Grady, 2006). 
 The final policy consideration that could be incorporated with conscientious 
objection is the requirement to register or commit in writing the objections to the state 
board or employer.  As was previously mentioned this would provide employers with the 
knowledge to appropriately assign clients.  In regards to private practice, a state listing by 
the board would provide clients with information to appropriately select a social worker.  
In addition to providing clients and employers with that knowledge, this policy 
consideration could also serve to partially meet the genuineness and reasonability 
requirements, as it would require social workers to publically state their conscientious 
objection.  This public declaration would leave little doubt to an outside committee that 
serving those clients would indeed violate a deeply held belief of the social worker.     
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, social work has been put in a precarious position of needing to 
respond to various state policies allowing social workers to conscientiously object to 
serving clients that may violate a deeply held belief of theirs.  Therefore, in order to bring 
that discussion to the forefront, this article explored conscientious objection as it applies 
to various professions, discussed the arguments for and against conscientious objection, 
and discussed the various routes that the profession could take.  Ultimately, it would be a 
mistake for the social work profession to sit back and allow others to define our values 
and practice without first engaging in that dialog ourselves. 
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